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Call Market Experiments: Efficiency and Price Discovery 
through Multiple Calls and Emergent Newton Adjustments†
By Charles R. Plott and Kirill Pogorelskiy*
We study  multiple-unit, laboratory experimental call markets in 
which orders are cleared by a single price at a scheduled “call.” 
The markets are independent trading “days” with two calls each day 
preceded by a continuous and public order flow. Markets approach 
the competitive equilibrium over time. The price formation dynamics 
operate through the flow of bids and asks configured as the “jaws” 
of the order book with contract execution featuring elements of an 
underlying mathematical principle, the  Newton-Raphson method 
for solving systems of equations. Both excess demand and its slope 
play a systematic role in call market price discovery. (JEL C92, D41, 
D44, G14)
This paper studies the principles governing price discovery and dynamics in call markets. Call markets accumulate orders until a scheduled time at which a 
“call” takes place, a single  market-clearing price is determined, and all exchanges 
take place at that price. Accumulation of orders over time creates “market depth,” 
which can conceivably lead to reducing the price variability. By contrast, the widely 
used continuous double auctions are founded on a different architecture in which 
order flow takes place continuously and the timing of contract executions is endog-
enous and possibly at different prices.
The three broad research questions are: (i) Do the basic laws of supply and 
demand operate as they are known to operate in continuous markets? (ii) What are 
the behavioral principles that guide the price dynamics? (iii) How do the institutions 
and rules together with behavioral principles operate to guide market performance?
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The call markets studied are organized as an exchange in which agents have mul-
tiple units. The analysis is restricted to the “pure” case of price discovery that is not 
complicated by agent uncertainty about the personal value of the traded item.1 The 
underlying flow of incentives to trade arrives in a series of independent periods that 
include an unannounced structural shift in the market parameters. A period is like 
a trading day in which two calls occur, prices are determined and exchanges take 
place.
Our results demonstrate that in the  two-call,  multiple-unit auctions market prices 
and volumes converge close but not perfectly to the competitive equilibrium derived 
from the underlying incentives. Efficiency is relatively high, increases over time and 
converges to near the competitive equilibrium level. Results are robust to the pres-
ence of a structural shift in the market parameters.
The results provide insights about a  long-standing mystery of how markets 
achieve an equilibrium defined as a solution to the equations created by the under-
lying incentives. An interpretation is that the market “discovers” the solutions to 
a system of equations that no one in the market knows. The model describes the 
formation process as working within a period through the multiple market “calls” to 
create a series of steps of information aggregation and computation leading to price 
changes and then to ultimate convergence across periods. The model begins with the 
order flow shaping “market jaws.” The price and time priority of the orders placed 
in the open order book produce a graphical representation (jaws) that approximates 
the slope of excess demand; and the difference between the number of buy and sell 
orders arriving shortly before a call price announcement approximates the excess 
demand at the price. Together, when operating in the multiple calls, the mechanisms 
exhibit features of the  Newton-Raphson method of finding the solutions to a system 
of equations as will be discussed in detail later. To emphasize the combined model, 
we will refer to the model of the price discovery process as “ Newton-Jaws.” We 
feel compelled to warn the casual reader that this model has nothing to do with the 
jaws of the outstanding mathematician and physicist Sir Isaac Newton, after whom 
the respective numerical method is named. We also need to emphasize that rela-
tionships are confined to strong similarities and that differences do exist between 
 Newton-Jaws and the Newton method as used in numerical analysis.
Walrasian adjustment, the main alternative to  Newton-Jaws, also finds support, 
but  Newton-Jaws performs better by comparison. Simulations with  zero-intelligence 
agents in Appendix B demonstrate that  the Newton-Jaws model has a solid founda-
tion: it is a property of the call market institution (together with underlying demand/
supply parameters) rather than a consequence of special or idiosyncratic features of 
traders’ strategic behavior.
1 A long history of research exists on the relationship between information aggregation and institutions. 
Experimental environments studied range from multiple states and multiple markets ( Arrow-Debreu securities), 
and single markets (winner’s curse), to cascades and bubbles. The institutions range from various forms of contin-
uous double auctions, call markets, quote markets, dealer markets, auctions (sealed bid, ascending price, etc.) and 
special mechanisms designed explicitly for the purpose of information aggregation. Our focus is on call markets 
with independent values about which there is no uncertainty. Even with the focus so restricted a substantial range 
of institutions exist. 
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The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section I provides a brief 
review of the background literature. Section II describes the experimental economic 
environment. Subsection IIA presents the call market institution we implemented 
in the lab. Subsections IIB and IIC describe our experimental procedures and the 
basic parameters, respectively. Sections III and IV describe models and theory 
behind their application to the actual data. Section V presents our main results. 
Section VI concludes. Appendices A and B contain additional estimation details, 
while Appendix C contains experimental instructions.
I. Background and Related Literature
Call markets share institutional features with many other types of markets. The 
term “call market” or “clearing house” is typically reserved for a complex class of 
institutions with a designated time for tenders and simultaneous price discovery, 
operating in environments with multiple buyers and sellers. This class of institu-
tions is large. For example, auctions, including any form of sealed-bid ones, can be 
viewed as special cases of call markets with a single seller (or buyer).
Major institutional differences aside, the principles that govern the behavior of 
call markets potentially have broad applications and motivate questions that run 
through several decades of experimental research. Experimental attention was drawn 
to similar institutions by the discovery2 that a posted price process exhibits different 
efficiency and price performance than the continuous double auction. The subse-
quent, overarching literature represents a meticulous exploration of blends of call 
markets and the continuous double auction that has led us to the experiments and 
models developed here. Cason and Friedman (1997) nicely summarize the issues: 
“The general question of price formation thus resolves into three research questions. 
What are the relevant market institutions? What are the equilibrium properties of 
such institutions? And to what extent do human traders come to approximate the 
equilibrium outcomes?”
The experimental focus was first drawn to periodic call markets by Smith et al. 
(1982), who observed that call market prices demonstrated a convergence process in 
a repetitive, stationary environment with multiple units. Price convergence was slow 
relative to continuous markets; the ultimate efficiency was below but comparable to 
the continuous double auction. McCabe, Rassenti, and Smith (1993) studied perfor-
mance of call markets with differing features, including multiple units, open/closed 
book, freedom to modify or cancel (at a cost) orders during bid tenders, different 
call and pricing rules, and different order submission rules.3 Similarly to the earlier 
work, they observed convergence fell short of the competitive equilibrium. Why 
convergence was slow and what changes might make it faster were open questions 
that emerged from the work.
Guided by the theoretical development of Wilson (1987) and Satterthwaite and 
Williams (1993), the experimental work of Friedman (1993), Cason and Friedman 
2 See Plott and Smith (1978). 
3 Their research was motivated by the rule used in the Arizona stock exchange (1992–2001) and by an interest 
in isolating procedures and rules that might enhance the performance of call markets. 
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(1997), and Kagel (2004) explored principles of call market price formation under 
very strong conditions that allowed a test of the Bayes Nash Equilibrium model. 
Presumably, a better understanding of the details of bidder behavior would  produce 
insights about the behavior of the system.4 The environment included a closed 
book during bid tenders, a  one-unit restriction on individual preferences, randomly 
changing costs and values, and price determination rules that provided a clear view 
of individual strategies. Their experiments produced systematic deviations from the 
Bayes Nash Equilibrium model and the patterns they observed motivated a conjec-
ture that a learning aspect was needed. Models based on exposed decision errors 
and missed trades seemed promising. Such models were consistent with behavior 
observed in second-price auctions by Garvin and Kagel (1994) and also by Cason 
and Friedman (1999a).
Suggestion of a learning process in the randomly changing environment led natu-
rally to a question about whether having multiple calls in a single period would lead 
to the emergence of price convergence and efficiency. Cason and Friedman (1999b, 
2008), investigated this possibility with a mechanism they called the Multiple Call 
Market. They explored the question in a “thin” market environment, which classical 
theory suggests is extremely challenging, especially for the study of delicate strate-
gic relationships. They observed substantial inefficiencies that they attribute to the 
thin markets.
A natural question motivated by the Cason and Friedman experiments is whether 
or not thicker markets with public (open) book, bid adjustment flexibility, and mul-
tiple calls will enhance call market performance. The issue receives some support 
from the experiments of Cason and Plott (1996), who study call markets in a repli-
cating environment with individual bidder incentives determined at random. When 
viewed from one call to the next, the replicating environment has coordination and 
information similarities to those of multiple calls within a period. Cason and Plott 
observe both efficiency and price convergence to near competitive equilibrium 
 levels. More importantly, they also reported value revelation of extra marginal units, 
which is directly related to the role that value revelation of marginal and extra mar-
ginal units can play in forming a process of convergence when market environments 
are repeated across periods.
A connection between excess demand and price changes was established early 
(Smith 1965). A connection between prices and order flow as represented by excess 
bids (i.e., total buy orders minus total sell orders) was established later (Smith, 
Suchanek, and Williams 1988), leading to a  long-standing challenge to understand 
the mechanisms at work. That work as well as Selten and Neugebauer (2014) find 
substantial support for the excess bids model as a predictor of prices. Their analysis 
leaves open the question of whether or not the excess bids model is more accu-
rate than the classical excess demand model or the  Newton-Jaws model developed 
below, and what might be the source of its accuracy in predicting price changes.
Studying the market adjustments in response to an unstable competitive equilib-
rium, Plott and George (1992) demonstrated that a special type of call market with 
4 See also Friedman and Ostroy (1995) who investigated several equilibrium models in a  quantity-only call 
market they called CHQ. 
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price changes responding to bids and asks through an explicit tâtonnement secant 
mechanism (a “smart” market approximation of the Newton method)  converges to 
the nearest Walrasian stable competitive equilibrium.5 This discovery  re-emphasizes 
the central role of excess demand, as well as its slopes, in determining price adjust-
ment and discovery process, and thus the importance of excluded bids and asks in 
approximating those slopes. The insight becomes enhanced with the idea that the 
excluded bids and asks in the continuous double auction, captured by the order book 
shape, perform the same function. The  jaw-type structure of the order flow recorded 
in the order book is related to the rules governing the order book for continuous, 
 multiple-unit double auctions.6 That possibility was formalized by Bossaerts and 
Plott (2008) as the market “jaws”: a Newton adjustment process based on the 
 jaw-shaped order book could contribute to price convergence in the continuous 
double auction.7 Whether a  Newton-Jaws type adjustment operates in a discrete, 
 multiple-call market environment has not been investigated until now.
The call market exchange we explore in this paper incorporates several features 
shown to be important in the literature. The exchange consists of multiple (two) calls 
in each of a series of periods replicated under stationary market demand and supply 
schedules. The order book is open so all participants can view the order flow and 
the tentative price, which is continuously computed and displayed. Following the 
rules of the call market that has become known as the uniform price double action 
(UPDA) as introduced by McCabe, Rassenti, and Smith (1993), bids and asks can 
be tendered, adjusted, or cancelled at any time during the order submission period. 
After a call, each participant sees the volume, own transactions, and the untraded 
bids and asks, which remain in the book, as is the case with the Cason and Friedman 
rules. Markets are not thin in the sense of Cason and Friedman since agents have 
multiple units and there are typically more than ten buyers and ten sellers. Given 
previous experiments and theory, all of the features suggest that we should observe 
price discovery and efficiency convergence. The experimental questions are whether 
convergences indeed occur and if so, what dynamic model can approximate the 
process.
Our results demonstrate the existence of a price formation process that embodies 
the logic of the  Newton-Raphson method of solving systems of equations, build-
ing on and extending the previous results. The information used in price forma-
tion exists in the order flow and encompasses both the information contained in the 
excess demand and the information in the excess bids (i.e., total buy orders minus 
total sell orders). However, additional information about the separate slopes of the 
demand and supply functions is supplied by the “jaws”: the values of the excluded 
5 Gjerstad (2013) studied the price dynamics in a continuous double auction, and used a Hahn stochastic pro-
cess to estimate disequilibrium price adjustment within a period, which is an alternative approach to modeling the 
dynamics. 
6 The definition and rules as first developed by Plott and Gray (1990) use price/time priority for listing in the 
book. Subsequent computerized markets such as MUDA (Johnson, Lee, and Plott 1989) and the more advanced 
Marketscape (for a 1997 animation illustrating the jaws dynamics of the order flow using Marketscape visit http://
eeps.caltech.edu/mov/jaws.html) made a graphical representation of the data available to traders in real time.
7 A  Newton-based adjustment process was tested and rejected for the continuous double auction when operating 
in an environment with unstable equilibria. See Hirota et al. (2005). 
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bids and asks. This information is used by a  Newton-like process of price formation 
and discovery.
There is a growing interest in call markets applications inspired by the possibil-
ity that call markets can be useful supplements to other forms of markets. While 
such possibilities raise basic science challenges far beyond the questions posed here, 
introducing the respective connections puts the research reported here in a broader 
context. Budish, Cramton, and Shim (2015) argue that call markets might avoid 
difficulties caused by  high-frequency trading. Brewer, Cvitanic, and Plott (2013) 
suggest call markets as a tool to deal with flash crashes that might occur in con-
tinuous markets. The Euronext and Xetra exchanges use call markets combined 
with other forms of markets to open and close trading based on the theory that it 
improves price discovery.8 A completely different approach is taken by Selten and 
Neugebauer (2014), who attempt to create phenomena reported in the finance litera-
ture as “puzzles” in the laboratory. Notwithstanding the design differences, they also 
find support for the predictive model of price formation based on excess bids. They 
argue that path dependence between current and past excess bids, i.e., the adaptive 
model of price formation, operates at the individual level, while in our experiment 
this mechanism is eliminated by book clearing at the end of each period.9
What form a call market should take to meet these challenges, how they would 
perform, or what forms the theory might take to unravel the challenges presented by 
field observations are beyond the scope of this paper.
II. Environment
In this section, we describe the experimental call markets implemented in the 
laboratory.
A. institution, Rules, and Timing
The call market we study is based on a double auction design in which both bids 
to buy and asks to sell are tendered. Unlike the continuous time double auction, 
trades only happen at a call. Before the start of the experiment, the subjects are des-
ignated as buyers or as sellers, which they keep for the entire experimental session. 
Each session consists of several periods, developed as follows.
Before the start of a period, costs and redemption values are induced. Costs are 
distributed in terms of buy orders from the experimenter to the sellers (who would 
buy from the experimenter and resell to buyers) and redemption values are distrib-
uted in terms of sell orders from the experimenter to the buyers (who would buy 
from sellers and resell to the experimenter). These  incentive-based orders are placed 
in a private market accessible only by the subject for whom they are intended. No 
8 See van Bommel and Hoffmann (2011). 
9 See also Selten and Neugebauer (2015), who compare call markets and double auctions, and report the call 
markets as less effective. They do not explore variations of the two institutions or isolate the principles that seem 
to be operating. 
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inventories in terms of units or orders are carried over from period to period. All 
values, costs, and prices were specified in experimental currency called “francs.”
A public (trading) market opens at the beginning of each period. In this pub-
lic market, two calls are performed each period. The first call is 1.5 minutes into 
the period and the second is 4.5 minutes into the period (3 minutes later), leaving 
1.5 minutes to redeem units purchased or return unsold units to the experimenter 
when no more calls remain in the period.10
At any time during the period, sellers can place sell orders and buyers can place 
buy orders to the public market. Orders are ranked (buy orders from high to low 
and sell orders from low to high) according to the execution mechanism, should a 
call take place. The orders are published on a screen so any trader can see every-
one’s orders in the sequence of potential executions. Orders are also displayed in 
the graphical form by means of demand and supply curves based on the current 
order book. Orders can be canceled and  resubmitted at any time before the call so 
the curves and prices can shift around before the call. No constraints are placed on 
orders except by limiting the number of units to six. Subjects are allowed to ten-
der potentially unprofitable offers. Thus, the technology allows subjects to attempt 
to manipulate the price. The number of orders a subject can have simultaneously 
placed on the public market at any given time is limited by the number of units made 
available by the experimenter.
At each call, all buy and sell orders in the order book are simultaneously consid-
ered and a market price is established. It is determined as follows:
•	 Based	on	all	orders	in	the	book,	the	system	sorts	buy	orders	by	their	respective	
prices per unit from high to low. Sell orders are sorted by their respective prices 
per unit from low to high.
•	 The	system	matches	two	sorted	series	selecting	all	pairs	for	which	the	purchase	
price is greater than the sale price, and stops at the last pair for which this is 
true.
•	 The	market	price	is	calculated	midway	between	the	last	accepted	(the lowest 
filled) buy order and the last accepted (highest filled) sell order. Except for ties, 
all buy orders with prices above the market price will trade at the market price. 
All sell orders with prices below the market price will trade at the market price. 
All other orders will remain unfilled.
Technically, the call price (the market clearing price announced at a call) must be 
computed from discrete or integer-valued bids and asks, and is determined from 
submitted orders as follows. Let  z be an index of buy orders (bids) ordered from 
high to low and sell orders (asks) ordered from low to high. Thus,  z is an index of 
ordered pairs  (b(z), a(z)) , where  b(z) is the bid, and  a(z) is the ask of the  z th pair. 
Let  z ∗ be the smallest  z for which  b(z + 1) < a(z + 1) . Thus,  z ∗ is the index of the 
10 The last 1.5 minutes of a period were unnecessary for the call market functioning, but allowed the subjects 
to learn the outcome of the second call trade and manually convert their units on hand into francs if they wished to 
do so. As a convenience feature, the software automatically converted all units on hand into francs at the end of the 
period using traders’ true value and cost schedules. 
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“last trade,” the last accepted bid, and the last accepted ask. A market clearing price 
is any  p ∗ > 0 such that:
•	 for		z ≤  z ∗ ,  b(z )  ≥  p ∗ and  a(z )  ≤  p ∗ ; and
•	 	 p ∗ ∈  [max { b(  z ∗ + 1), a(  z ∗ )}, min { b(  z ∗ ), a(  z ∗ + 1)}] .
The concept of a market clearing price is related to the concept of a competitive 
equilibrium in the sense that the competitive equilibrium is a market clearing price 
but the competitive equilibrium price is based on the concepts of market demand 
and supply and not just the bids and asks that happened to have been submitted prior 
to a call. The distinctions will be addressed in the Section III discussion about the 
dynamics of convergence in an ongoing market system.
Participants have profits continuously updated. A history of all trades up to the 
current time is always available. Remaining orders in private markets are always 
displayed. Untraded units are returned to the experimenter at the private market 
price at the end of each period.
B. Experimental Procedures
Subjects were recruited from Caltech and Purdue University. In total, 123 sub-
jects participated. Upon  sign-up for the experiment, subjects received an  email with 
the hyperlink to the actual experiment webpage, instructions, and the demo. We also 
recorded and uploaded a short video describing the details of the experiment using 
the software interface.11 The instructions are available in Appendix C. Subjects 
were paid after the end of the session by checks mailed to the addresses they speci-
fied at the  sign-up. In all sessions, subjects made decisions via Internet using a web 
browser. Each session had  18 to  19 periods and lasted about  2 hours. Subjects were 
not informed about the last period unless it was over.
The first three periods were practice periods using a specially designed set of 
parameters that allowed low gains and low losses. Subjects were told that the first 
three periods were designed to help them understand how the software worked. 
Subjects were instructed that if they failed to make a profit in the first three peri-
ods to demonstrate their understanding of the trading system, they would receive a 
 show-up payment but would not be used in the experiment. A frequent mistake was 
related to thinking that they should exercise all orders found in their private order 
books, e.g., sell all units they could independently of profitability.
Subjects were randomly assigned as buyers and sellers, and their types were fixed 
during the session. However, buyer redemption values and seller costs were changed 
once after the practice and once after a parameter shift, as explained below. Buyers 
(sellers) could submit buy (sell),  multiple-unit orders in a public market and redeem 
their values (costs) from the experimenter using their private values (costs) markets.
Table 1 presents the summary of the experimental sessions.
11 The video is available at http://tinyurl.com/kcq6pmb. 
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Subjects’ earnings in francs were exchanged into US dollars at the end of the 
experiment. Average earnings were $19.57 per hour.
C. Basic Parameters
We chose the basic parameters in the experiment to satisfy a wide range of cri-
teria implied by our focus on convergence and market dynamics. In sessions  1–4, 
we used three types of buyers and three types of sellers, where each subject’s type 
defines her private costs/values. In sessions  5–7, we used five types of buyers and 
five types of sellers. Table 2 contains the costs and values for all our setups.12 In all 
12  Multiple-unit demand and supply creates a possibility for strategic price manipulation by “withholding” 
units to create shortages, which could, in turn, influence the speed and efficiency of market adjustments and induce 
strategic behavior that  game-theoretic models attempt to understand. Our choice of parameters reflects our interest 
in price discovery and the fundamental principles of convergence and price dynamics across calls in competitive 
markets. Researchers interested in the challenge posed by withholding strategies could explore the incentives for 
Table 2—Experimental Parameters
Sessions Types
Private values/costs per unit, francs
ShiftUnit  1 Unit  2 Unit  3 Unit  4 Unit  5 Unit  6+ 
1– 4 B1 210 195 190 155 150 120 75 added
B2 220 200 175 165 145 115 to each unit
B3 215 195 185 160 140 125
S1 120 150 155 175 195 205
S2 115 145 165 185 200 210
S3 125 140 160 180 190 215
5–7 B1 250 208 203 170 144 120 83 added
B2 246 213 199 165 140 118 to each unit
B3 242 218 195 160 133 115
B4 238 224 190 155 130 112
B5 234 230 186 150 125 110
S1 110 150 155 185 214 235
S2 115 146 160 190 218 240
S3 120 142 165 196 222 245
S4 122 137 170 204 226 250
S5 126 132 174 209 230 255
Notes: Types indicators correspond to (B)uyers and (S)ellers. All sessions included  three -period practice with dif-
ferent test parameters. After end of practice and after shift, all types were rotated.
Table 1—All Experimental Sessions
Session
no. Date
Practice,  
periods
Pre-shift,  
periods
Post-shift, 
periods
Initial  
subjects
Paid  
subjects
Average 
payoff, $
Exchange 
rate
1 2012–05–11 3 8 8 17 14 45.21 1f = 3.5¢
2 2012–05–12 3 8 8 13 13 48.85 1f = 3.5¢
3 2012–12–01 4 7 7 15 15 36.13 1f = 3.5¢
4 2012–12–13 3 8 8 17 17 41.06 1f = 3.5¢
5 2013–02–23 3 8 8 21 19 34.79 1f = 2.5¢
6 2013–03–02 3 8 8 21 21 37.38 1f = 2.5¢
7 2013–05–16 3 9 7 19 17 30.59 1f = 2.5¢
Note: After end of practice and after shift, all types were rotated.
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sessions, we also implemented a parameter shift around period 9 after the end of 
practice. The shift increased all costs and values by the specified amount of francs. 
Types were rotated after the parameter shift. Subjects were assigned to types uni-
formly so that the market contained multiple traders of each type.
Figure 1 illustrates the main features of the experimental call market. The left 
panel of Figure 1 shows the time series of the call prices for each call in the exper-
iment of  2013–03–02. We see how call prices converge to the competitive equi-
librium (dashed line) as determined by the classical demand and supply model up 
to period 9, when the upshift of equilibrium price by about 80 francs takes place, 
which resets the convergence anew. The right panel of Figure 1 depicts the order 
book of the experiment ( 2013–03–02), period 11. The market demand and supply 
are based on the induced values and costs used in that period, as well as the revealed 
demand and supply based on the order flow, the buy orders (bids) and sell orders 
(asks) in the book for the two calls. The patterns of the orders in the book resemble 
a “hockey stick” with the handle appearing flat and near the market price and the 
blades at angles reflecting and approximating the relative values of excluded units. 
The submitted values of the marginal and  extra-marginal units along the “blade” 
of the hockey stick, play an important role in the price dynamics, as we demon-
strate below. These values taken together will be called the market “jaws”—an open 
mouth ready to bite as illustrated in the figure.
withholding by tweaking our parameters near the equilibrium prices in order to reduce the elasticity of demand and 
supply. 
Figure 1. Call Price Dynamics in the Experiment on  2013–03–02
Notes: Call prices shown are the actual prices from the experiment. Competitive equilibrium (CE) period prices, 
which can differ from experiment to experiment due to different numbers of participants, are shown as the dashed 
line, which is average of the CE price over the corresponding period across all our experiments. After period 8, there 
is an exogenous shock (parameter shift). The market jaws are formed each call by the excluded bids (lower jaw) and 
excluded asks (upper jaw) that resemble an open mouth of a fish swimming to the right.
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III. Models
The price discovery model explored here is a process of convergence based on 
insights from three sources, each of which suggests a separate element of the overall 
model. The first is the classical theory of price adjustment that supplies the most 
basic of principles that price changes are responsive to excess demand. The sec-
ond is a more abstract literature that points to the possible role of the slope of the 
excess demand. Both are introduced in Subsection IIIA. The third, introduced in 
Subsection IIIB, is the understanding provided by “market jaws” that order flow 
as shaped by specific market making institutions is a fundamental source of the 
information and commitments required by an equilibration process. Together, these 
principles operate with properties similar to the Newton method of finding zeroes 
of a differentiable function as will be illustrated in Subsection IIIC. The connection 
with numerical methods provides a framework for understanding how institutions 
coordinate decisions and interact with decentralized information, and helps focus on 
where institutional changes might improve market functioning.
A. The classical concepts of Demand, supply, and Equilibration
The market demand function,  D( p) and the market supply function,  s( p) , express 
the quantity that buyers are willing to buy at price  p and the quantity that sellers are 
willing to sell at price  p and are derived from respective utility and profit maximi-
zation with the assumption that decision makers treat prices as constants. Excess 
demand at a market price,  p , is defined as  ED( p) = D( p) − s( p) . The classical 
concept of a competitive equilibrium price is a price  p ∗ such that  ED(  p ∗ ) = 0 . 
Since the demand and supply functions are generally not observable, the concept 
of “price discovery” has emerged over the decades in response to the view that the 
equilibrium price is the solution to equations that no one in the market knows.
Classical theory of price discovery works through an abstract adjustment process 
termed “tâtonnement.” It is as if a price is announced (by a fictional agent some-
times called the “Walrasian auctioneer”), the excess demand is observed and, with-
out trading taking place, a new adjusted price is announced based on the revealed 
excess demand quantity. The price movement motivated by the model is summa-
rized by the classical price adjustment equation:
(1)  dp ___
dt
 = A [ D( p) − s( p)] ,  A > 0 .
Under appropriate conditions this adjustment will converge to  p ∗ : ED(  p ∗ ) = 0 .13
A natural technical generalization of the classical model, that strengthens the 
conditions under which price discovery can happen, is based on a Newton adjust-
ment derived from the Taylor expansion:
(2)  dp ___
dt
 = − D( p) − s( p)  __________ D ′ ( p) −  s ′ ( p) .
13 For the background and development of this class of models see McKenzie (2002). 
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This extension postulates that the constant,  A , in the tâtonnement model is replaced 
by a function of the excess demand derivative,  − 1/( D ′ ( p) −  s ′ ( p)) . Thus, the pro-
cess could be dependent on both  ED( p) and  E D ′ ( p) as opposed to  ED( p) alone, and, 
as has been explored by Saari and Simon (1978) and Saari (1985), the additional 
information has implications for price discovery, i.e., convergence to a competitive 
equilibrium. However, the Walrasian auctioneer would not have access to the addi-
tional information and the range of institutions that might carry the information has 
remained an open question.
B. Market Jaws
Market institutions that have evolved over the decades are populated with addi-
tional institutional features that can be a source of information. For example, evi-
dence exists that suggests that such source could be the order flow of the continuous 
double auction (Asparouhova, Bossaerts, and Plott 2003; Bossaerts and Plott 2008; 
Barner, Feri, and Plott 2005). Bossaerts and Plott (2008) suggest that the informa-
tion is in the market order “book” and term the source “market jaws.” The question 
explored here is whether a similar process and source of information might exist for 
call market institutions.
The structure of the data in the order book is sometimes described as an open 
mouth with an upper jaw and a lower jaw, together with a tongue, which is a curve 
tracing the average of the two. Market jaws provide a snapshot of commitments by 
potential traders that approximate important features of observed market adjust-
ments in continuous markets. Here, the model is adapted for call markets institu-
tions. When a call takes place, these commitments together with market making 
rules define exchanges that are executed at the call.
The basic intuition is as follows. As order flow develops and bids and asks are 
submitted, the shape of the order book changes in a  self-organizing and specific way 
that reflects aggregate demand and supply. In order to become “provisional traders” 
who would trade if a call took place, traders can revise their bids and asks in an 
attempt to meet or beat the competition in light of the offers tendered by the other 
side of the market. The tendency of bidders to anticipate the bids of others is an 
established property of call markets (Cason and Friedman 1997; Kagel 2004). For 
the marginal and extra marginal units outside the expected set of provisional trades, 
the possibility that the price changes randomly can create incentives for value rev-
elation. Value revelation is encouraged by the possibility to trade in the case the 
market “jumps” from expected price.
As a result, the order book is continuously updated as traders update their orders 
in light of the orders of others. The orders of those traders whose true values are 
extra marginal at the current price are pushed out. Bidders change their offers with 
increasing revelation of the marginal values in response. The shape of the book 
resembles jaws, hence, the name.
To illustrate, consider Figure 2. Consider  p 1 , the actual price at the end of the first 
call and  q 1 , the actual total volume at the end of the first call. We fit a line to the 
unfilled asks that exist in the order book at the end of the first call. We only use the 
first  τ unfilled asks in order to avoid the extremely high asks that sometimes show 
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up in the book, and also due to the local nature of Newton approximation. We also 
restrict the fitted line to go through the point  (  p 1 ,  q 1 ) , and denote  x τ the price at 
which the line cuts through  q τ =  q 1 + τ , the corresponding quantity. Similarly, we 
fit a line to the unfilled bids in the book at the end of the first call, denoting  y τ the 
price at which the line cuts through  q τ .
When the two fitted lines are imposed at the point  (  p 1 ,  q 1 ) , as illustrated in 
Figure 2, we obtain a graphical representation of the market jaws: the “upper jaw” 
given by the line connecting  (  p 1 ,  q 1 ) to  (  x τ ,  q τ ) , and the “lower jaw” given by the 
line connecting  (  p 1 ,  q 1 ) to  (  y τ ,  q τ ) . We will refer to these lines as  s ˆ1 and  D ˆ 1 , respec-
tively, and treat them as tangents to a smoothed out model of the revealed supply 
and demand as represented by the unfilled asks and bids in the order book.14 That 
is, we are going to use their slopes as an estimate of the excess demand slope when 
evaluated at the price of the first call. The excess demand slope is one of the two key 
features of the Newton adjustment, as explained below.
Now, define  α , the angle between the upper jaw,  s ˆ1 , and price,  p 1 , using the slope 
of  s ˆ1 :
  tan α =   x τ −  p 1  ______ q τ −  q 1  ⏟=τ
, 
and define  β , the angle between price  p 1 and the lower jaw,  D ˆ 1 , via
  tan β =   y τ −  p 1  ______ q τ −  q 1  ⏟=τ
. 
14 We fit  D ˆ 1 and  s ˆ1 to the data by ordinary least squares in a  non-trivial way as described in detail in Appendix A. 
Figure 2. Theory Behind the Jaws, Applied after the First Call
Note:  The jaws are formed by the fitted line segments of demand  D ˆ 1 and supply  s ˆ1 , remaining after the call.
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The true demand and supply curves (based on the private values and costs of the 
traders present at both calls) in Figure 2 are given by  D( · ) and  s( · ) , respectively. 
For the sake of clarity, they are drawn as continuous curves, but in the actual exper-
iment  D( · ) and  s( · ) are discrete  step-wise curves, just like the corresponding 
actual order book. The market level, induced (true) demand/supply curves have the 
corresponding angles at price  p 1 being  α ∗ and  β ∗ , respectively (see Figure 2).
The jaws model of the order book dynamics postulates two important properties 
in the call market environment.
First, excess demand slope revelation: the excluded traders’ orders accumulate 
according to the ranking of their true values and costs, and therefore the book at 
the call reflects the true slopes of aggregate demand and supply at the call price. 
Thus, the first property says: the slopes of both revealed jaws closely approximate 
the slopes of the true demand and supply at price  p 1 , or equivalently,  α ≈  α ∗ and β ≈  β ∗ .
Second, excess demand revelation: the number of bids in excess of the num-
ber of asks arriving in a fixed period shortly before a call is proportional to excess 
demand at the call price. The theoretical intuition behind the second property is that 
an approaching call motivates the traders to actively submit and adjust their bids 
and asks. The rate of bids and asks depends on the number of units desired and the 
number of buyers and sellers, and thus the excess demand at the current price.
As we show below, these properties are crucial for interpreting the price dynam-
ics across calls as one step of the  Newton-Raphson method of finding zeroes of a 
differentiable function. Multiple steps involving multiple periods require additional 
abstraction. The two properties, slope and excess demand revelation, also rely on the 
more fundamental feature of Marshallian adjustment path.15
C. Newton and Walrasian Adjustment
In this section, we operationalize the technical properties of Walras and Newton 
adjustment, which are useful in testing and estimation. We begin by discretizing the 
tâtonnement equations (1) and (2) by replacing the derivative on the left-hand side 
of the expressions by a price difference,  Δp =  p t+1 −  p t . This represents one step 
of an iterative process that starts from an initial price  p 0 and converges to an equilib-
rium price  p ∗ that solves  ED(  p ∗ ) = 0 . In a  Newton-type process each successive 
root approximation at time  t + 1 depends on both the excess demand and the slope 
of the excess demand, and can be written formally as
(3)  p t+1 −  p t = − D(  p t )  − s(  p t )  __________ D ′ (  p t )  −  s ′ (  p t ) ,
15 The Marshallian path is an empirical property that buyers with high values and sellers with low costs are 
those that first find their way to trade, and if they have multiple units, they trade their most profitable ones first. 
This is the mysterious property predicted by the Wilson model, observed as part of BNE performance by Cason 
and Friedman (1997), and Kagel (2004), and documented as a feature of the continuous double auction by Plott, 
Roy, and Tong (2013). 
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where  p t is the market price at time  t ,  D( · ) and  s( · ) denote the true demand and 
supply curves, and  D ′ ( · ) and  s ′ ( · ) are their respective derivatives.
In the Newton numerical method of finding a root of a differentiable function, 
iterations in (3) are repeated until the stopping criterion (e.g., the desired tolerance) 
is reached. Unlike the traditional scheme, we take only one step of this scheme. 
Furthermore, the Newton numerical process has all information about the functions 
when it starts, while the market price discovery process requires new information at 
each step, and the new information is based on the results of the previous step. From 
a bidder’s point of view, new bids at any call are based on the previously announced 
price, a feature that suggests a need for theory.
The price difference on the left-hand side of (3) can be taken either (i) between 
prices realized at two subsequent time moments (e.g., two calls within one period, 
producing the difference  (  p 2 −  p 1 ) ), or (ii) between a Walrasian theoretical 
 market-clearing price and the price at a given call. In other words, we could have 
replaced the second time period of our model with the theoretical  perfect-competition 
Walrasian market. If we did so, we would then be able to test convergence to the 
Walrasian model. Thus, we can also use the equilibrium price  p ∗ instead of  p t+1 in (3) for the purpose of an alternative test of equilibration: asymptotically as  t grows 
large, the iterations should converge to the equilibrium point. This results in two 
additional price differences:  (  p ∗ −  p 1 ) and  (  p ∗ −  p 2 ) . We report these alongside the 
 between-call difference in Results 5, 6, and 7 below. Notice that if the price dynam-
ics followed Newton and we knew the excess demand and its derivative at time  t , 
then we could use the price at time  t and (3) to predict price at time  t + 1 .
A natural alternative to the Newton dynamics is Walrasian adjustment, where
(4)  p t+1 −  p t = A [D(  p t )  − s(  p t )]  .
Thus, the difference of Walrasian adjustment from Newton is that the former does 
not utilize the slopes of excess demand, assuming that the price change is propor-
tional to the excess demand with some positive constant factor  A .16
The information about the excess demand and its slope can be related to the mar-
ket jaws. This relationship is based on two hypothesized properties of the jaws we 
described in Subsection IIIB. First, (slope revelation:) the slopes of revealed jaws 
will closely approximate the slopes of the true demand and supply at price  p 1 , i.e., 
in terms of Figure 2,  α ≈  α ∗ and  β ≈  β ∗ . Second, (excess demand revelation:) 
the pattern of jaws changing shortly before the call will reflect excess demand at 
price  p 1 , the second key property of the dynamic model, via the relative excess of 
the number of bids over the number of asks.
16 In some continuous time environments, in particular, in unstable environments of Scarf (1960), where prices 
do not converge to the competitive equilibrium, Walrasian adjustment finds more support than Newton (Hirota et al. 
2005). Assured global convergence to the competitive equilibrium via an iterative procedure in general environ-
ments cannot be guaranteed (Saari 1985). However, the information about excess demand and its slope suffices for 
local convergence (Saari and Simon 1978), and is particularly relevant in our environment with  quasi-linear supply 
and demand, and no income effects. Hence one would expect that in a particular environment like our experiment, 
with less stringent information requirements, the knowledge of the first derivative of the excess demand should 
allow Newton to perform better than Walras. 
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Denote  ˆ  ED(  p 1 ) the revealed excess demand. Consider Figure 2 again. If the first 
property of the jaws holds as a perfect equality,
  s ̂′ =  s ′ (  p t )  = tan ( π __2 −  α ∗ ) = cot  α ∗ ;
  D ˆ ′ =  D ′ (  p t )  = tan ( π __2 +  β ∗ ) = − cot  β ∗ .
If the second property holds perfectly,  ˆ  ED(  p t )  = D(  p t )  − s(  p t ) . Then using (3), 
the price dynamics across calls follows Newton if and only if
  p t+1 −  p t =   ˆ  ED(  p t ) ______ s ˆ′ −  D ˆ ′ .
These relationships summarize the main property of  Newton-Jaws.
IV. Statistical Models
A. statistics of convergence
We use a simple dynamic model to assess convergence to theoretical predic-
tions, which in our case is the competitive equilibrium. The basic idea is to establish 
whether the difference between the data and the corresponding equilibrium goes to 
a common asymptote of zero as periods in an experiment proceed. The model was 
developed by Noussair, Plott, and Riezman (1995).17
The original model is modified to account for a shift in parameters that occurs 
after the first several periods. The model for price convergence is as follows:
(5)  p it −  p it ∗ =  (  α  t ̃1   δ 1  ______ t −  t ̃1 + 1 +   β 1  __t )  d 1  + ⋯  + ( 
 α  t ̃i   δ i  ______ 
t −  t ̃i + 1 +  
 β i  __t )  d i 
 + ⋯ +  (  α  t ̃K   δ K  ______ t −  t ̃K + 1 +   β K  ___t )  d K + γ (1 −  1 __t ) +  ε it ,  
where  i indexes experimental market sessions;  t indexes periods in a session starting 
from  1 ;  p it is the average market price in period  t of experimental market session 
 i ;  p it ∗ is the equilibrium market price in period  t of the same session;  K is the total 
number of experimental sessions (we ran  7 );  d i , i ∈ {1, … , K } is a dummy vari-
able corresponding to experimental session  i ;  β i is the origin of the corresponding 
time series;  t ̃i indexes the period when the parameter shift18 occurs in session  i ; α  t ̃i  is a dummy variable that corresponds to the shift, i.e.,  α  t ̃i  = 0 for  t <  t ̃i , and α  t ̃i  = 1 for  t ≥  t ̃i ;  δ i captures the “new origin” effect, created by the shift;  γ is the 
17 Noussair, Plott, and Riezman named it the AElG model after Orley Ashenfelter and Mahmoud  El-Gamal 
whose suggestions led to the development of the model. 
18 In our experiments, most shifts occurred in the  ninth period following the practice period. 
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asymptote of the series common to all experimental sessions; and, finally,  ε it is a 
random error.
The same equation with  p it −  p it ∗ replaced by  q it −  q it ∗ is used to estimate volume 
convergence.
The basic idea behind this dynamic model is as follows. In experimental market 
session  i , the difference between the data and the competitive equilibrium starts from 
some random origin, captured by  β i , and moves closer to the common asymptote γ as time (i.e., period number) increases from  1 to the time of the parameter shift, 
if there is convergence. At the time of the shift  t =  t ̃i , the term   α  t ̃i   δ i  _____ t −  t ̃i + 1 becomes 
 nonzero if  δ i ≠ 0 , and so it serves as an updated origin from which the difference 
on the left hand side of (5) starts to converge anew.
In theory, as time increases toward infinity, the updated origin receives less and 
less weight (and the initial origin even less), so the difference between the equilib-
rium of the model and the data converges to the asymptote  γ . Thus, if the estimate of 
γ is not significantly different from zero, we conclude that the data series converges 
to the equilibrium prediction perfectly.
Since we have two calls per period, there exist alternative ways to define  p it and 
p it ∗ because the model does not predict the dynamics within a period. We explicitly 
address this in subsection IIIC, where we describe the application of the Newton 
method to our data. For our convergence results, we defined the observed market 
price in a period,  p it , as the average realized price across two calls, and the equi-
librium market price in a period,  p it ∗, as the competitive equilibrium price, based on 
the private values and costs of buyers and sellers who were actively present19 in at 
least one of the two calls in the period. Since there was no  carry-over cost from call 
to call, the model predicts that the two calls should create the same price and that 
the total volume should be distributed to maintain the equal prices. The theoretical 
equilibrium price as well as volume could change in every period, depending on the 
number of traders who are present. Thus, we defined the actual volume in a period 
as the total number of units traded at both calls, and the equilibrium trading volume 
as the volume that corresponds to the equilibrium price  p it ∗.
B. Market Efficiency
As a measure of efficiency in each period, we used the consumer plus producer 
surplus expressed as a percentage of the maximum possible (Plott and Smith 1978). 
We define it as the difference between the total “consumption,” i.e., the franc redemp-
tion value of the purchased units, and the total franc cost of those units, divided by 
the maximum possible difference between total of redemption values and costs that 
19 By “actively present” we mean those participants who submit public orders before a call, i.e., reveal their 
wish to participate in trade. Note that it may happen that their orders do not trade at the call, but such orders form a 
part of the market supply and demand at a given call, and, hence, are taken into account. In experiments conducted 
with remotely located subjects, as opposed to all subjects confined to the laboratory, a degree of experimental 
control is lost. Subjects can become distracted or simply quit without warning. From one point of view, this phe-
nomenon is a lack of control, but a bid or ask reveals presence and parameters can be adjusted accordingly, so from 
another point of view the appearance or disappearance of subjects illustrates the robustness of a model that works. 
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can be achieved during a period. The maximum is achieved at the competitive equi-
librium allocation, which, if attained, is 100-percent efficient.
Let  R = {r} be the set of all redemption values to all buyers that participated in 
one or more of the two calls in period  t . Let  c = {c} be the set of all costs to all sell-
ers that participated in one or more of the two calls in period  t . Order the elements 
of  R from highest to lowest, with  r i being the  i th element. Order the elements of  c 
from lowest to highest with  c i being the  i th element. Let  R ∗ and  c ∗ denote the sets 
of redemptions and costs that were actually exercised during the period. Maximum 
Surplus is
  MS =  max 
z
    ∑ 
i=1
z
 (  r i −  c i ) .
Realized Surplus is
  RS =  ∑ 
r∈ R ∗ 
 r −  ∑ 
c∈ c ∗ 
 c .
We define efficiency in period  t as the ratio of the two quantities:
(6)  Efficiency =  Realized Surplus  _______________
Maximum Surplus
 .
Notice that subjects can submit  multiple-unit orders, and we explicitly account for 
this possibility in the efficiency score.
V. Results
All results in this section are presented in the form of a “result” statement fol-
lowed by the “support.” The result statement summarizes the authors’ qualitative 
interpretation of the data within the context of the abstract theory, and the sup-
port provides the precise relationships and technical details that justify the inter-
pretation. We present several types of results describing the market-level properties 
( macro-properties) of the call markets (convergence, efficiency, and price dynam-
ics.) Subsection VA addresses the traditional measures of market performance such 
as convergence of prices, volumes, and efficiency relative to the competitive equi-
librium. Subsection VB addresses the more detailed model of the nature of price 
adjustment as suggested by the Newton dynamic.
A. Market Performance Relative to the competitive Equilibrium
The section contains three results related to broad properties of the call markets. 
Together the results say that market behavior is captured reasonably well by the 
competitive equilibrium model. Prices, volumes, and efficiencies all converge to 
near the quantities predicted by the model. Price and volume behave substantially as 
predicted when parameters change. These are evident in Figures 3, 4, and 5 showing, 
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respectively, price convergence, volume convergence, and efficiencies in response 
to a market with a stationary demand and supply punctuated by a parameter shift in 
period 9, and then returning to a stationary level.
Result 1: In the  two-call  multiple-unit market, price and trading volume converge 
to near the equilibrium levels of the competitive equilibrium model. Equilibrium 
price upward shift affects price but not volume convergence, as predicted.
Support: Using data from seven market experiments, we estimate a simple 
dynamic model of convergence described in Subsection IVA for price (and volume) 
by equation (5).
We estimate the model in (5) using ordinary least squares with bootstrapped stan-
dard errors.20 Since we have the order book cleared across the periods, we can treat 
periods as independent observations.21 An estimate of the common asymptote,  γ , 
close to zero implies that the actual price/volume converges to the price/volume 
of the static theoretical model as time proceeds. The results of our estimation are 
reported in Table 3.
As Table 3 shows, we reject perfect price (volume) convergence: the estimated 
value of the asymptote  γ , 7.643 ( − 1.785 , resp.), is significantly different from zero, 
with its bootstrap standard error of 2.472 (0.465, resp.) Nevertheless, the estimated 
asymptotic differences are rather small: the equilibrium price in these experiments 
ranged from  165 to  280.5 francs (against the error of 7.643 francs, or about 3 percent 
to 5 percent of the equilibrium), and the equilibrium volume ranged from  17 to  32 units 
(against the error of 1.785 units, or about 6 percent to 11 percent of the equilibrium).
Figures 3–4 show graphically the price and volume dynamics across periods, 
averaged over all experiments. The spike at period 9 corresponds to the shift in 
parameters. Figure 3 also shows that for almost all periods, price at the second call 
is closer to equilibrium than price at the first one.
Notice also that the parameter shift effects are consistent with model predictions. 
In our experiments, the shift increases the equilibrium price by a constant, but does 
not change the equilibrium volume. The estimations in Table 3 display this feature: 
the updated origins after the shift,  δ 1 −  δ 7 (except  δ 3 and  δ 4 ), are highly significant 
20 We programmed the ordinary  nonparametric bootstrap with bias correction in R. All data and code are avail-
able from the authors upon request. Regression coefficient estimates in the tables are  bias-corrected, i.e., equal 
 β ̃ ≡  β ˆ −  ˆ  Bias =  β ˆ −  ( 1 __B  ∑ b=1 B  β ˆb ∗ −  β ˆ) , where  β ˆ is an OLS estimate from the original data sample,  β ˆb ∗ is an 
OLS estimate from  b th bootstrap sample, and  B is the total number of bootstrap samples (we use  B = 10, 000 ). 
Bootstrap standard error is  s( β ˆ∗ ) =  √ ______________________   1 ____ B − 1  ∑ b=1 B  ( β ˆb ∗ −  1 __B  ∑ b=1 B  β ˆb ∗) 2. Notice that while bootstrap standard errors 
can be used to test for significance of regression coefficients in a straightforward way by plugging them into the 
usual  t -statistic, doing so does not fully utilize the advantage of the bootstrap. A better test procedure we imple-
mented (percentile- t bootstrap test) uses bootstrap to compute the critical values from the finite sample distribution 
of the test statistic. Namely, to test hypothesis  H 0 : β =  β  0 versus the  two-sided alternative, we bootstrapped a 
symmetrical recentered  t -statistic  t ̂ b ∗ =  | β ˆb 
∗ −  β ˆ | _____
s( β ˆb ∗ ) to obtain the  1 − α quantiles of the bootstrap distribution  {  t ̂ b 
∗ } b=1 B , 
and compared them with the test statistic  t ̂ =  | β ˆ −  β 0 | _____
s( β ˆ) . Hypothesis is rejected at level  α if  t ̂ >  q 1−α ∗ . See Horowitz (2001) for details. 
21 Allowing for autocorrelation does not noticeably change the results. 
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and large for the price convergence equation, whereas for the volume convergence, 
only  δ 2 and  δ 3 are significant.
Taking together data from Table 3 and Figures 3–4, we argue that the price, and 
to a lesser extent, volume, converge close to their equilibrium levels. 
Table 3—Estimation of Convergence: Price and Quantity
Regressor Dependent variable
Price difference,  p it −  p it ∗ Volume difference,  q it −  q it ∗
Asymptote ( γ )   7.643   (2.472)   − 1.785   (0.465) 
Origin (before shift) in
session 1 ( β 1 )   − 17.390   (25.901)   − 1.814   (5.236) 
— 2 ( β 2 )   − 2.432   (12.215)   − 1.521   (2.268) 
— 3 ( β 3 )   − 22.616   (12.228)   − 10.560   (4.473) 
— 4 ( β 4 )   − 18.052   (12.681)   − 5.760   (4.089) 
— 5 ( β 5 )   − 64.243   (12.970)   − 1.433   (2.702) 
— 6 ( β 6 )   − 64.531   (23.390)   − 8.590   (3.369) 
— 7 ( β 7 )   − 22.606   (27.945)   − 3.940   (2.475) 
Origin (after shift) in
session 1 ( δ 1 )   − 42.382   (13.394)   − 2.497   (2.439) 
— 2 ( δ 2 )   − 53.154   (8.109)   − 5.620   (3.094) 
— 3 ( δ 3 ) 1.697   (8.906) 3.734   (1.698) 
— 4 ( δ 4 )   − 10.334   (10.608) 1.534   (2.844) 
— 5 ( δ 5 )   − 51.431   (11.579)   − 1.286   (3.461) 
— 6 ( δ 6 )   − 67.122   (15.202)   − 1.441   (3.836) 
— 7 ( δ 7 )   − 38.202   (14.426)   − 0.752   (1.341) 
Observations   94   94 
 R adj 2   0.732   0.638 
 F -stat   20.88   13.82 
Notes: Bootstrap standard errors are in parentheses. Estimates are bootstrap-corrected for bias. 
Figure 3. Average Price Dynamics across Periods
Note: There is a parameter shift at period 9.
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Result 2: The average efficiency score increases over time as price and volume 
converge to their equilibrium levels. The  two-call market does not achieve full effi-
ciency, but is about  83 percent efficient on average.
Support: We computed efficiency in each period of all experiments as the nor-
malized total surplus, defined in subsection IVB by equation (6).
The average efficiency score is  82.54 percent. This is a bit less than levels typically 
reported in  single-call market experiments (e.g., Cason and Friedman 1997 report 
an efficiency score of 87.3 percent). However, the average efficiency score increases 
over time, as price and volume converge to their equilibrium levels, with a sharp 
drop after the parameter shift, which corresponds to the market adjustment. Figure 5 
illustrates. It seems intuitive that the efficiency score should roughly correspond to 
how well the total volume in a period matches the equilibrium volume, provided the 
actual price is close to the equilibrium price.22 However, there is more to this than a 
simple comparison of total volumes: since subjects can make  multiple-unit orders, it 
is also matters that all subjects do not over- or  under-acquire their inventory.
Result 3: The parameter shift of demand and supply upward by a constant only 
affects the price, and not the volume of trading, as should be expected. There is no 
significant effect on the observed efficiency.
22 When the actual price is far from the equilibrium price, efficiency is low even if the volumes are matched 
exactly. This is the case, for example in the first period after practice in the experiment of Session 5 in Table 1: the 
equilibrium price was  188 , the actual price was  117 ; subjects acquired  26 units (with  28 units in equilibrium) and 
the efficiency score was the lowest: 28.28 percent. 
Figure 4. Average Volume Dynamics across Periods
Note: There is a parameter shift at period 9.
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Support: Table 4 presents the summary statistics of the data across periods, 
grouped by the parameter shift. As expected, the period volume before and after 
the parameter shift does not change much, since the shift only affected price, and 
not volume. The changes in equilibrium volume are due to the varying number of 
traders. The changes in efficiency are not significantly different ( Mann-Whitney 
p = 0.172 ).
B. Principles and Models of Price Discovery:  Newton-Jaws and Alternatives
In this subsection, we demonstrate that key elements of market jaws and the 
Newton method, characterized in subsections IIIB and IIIC, are observed in the 
call markets. We organize the results into two parts, focusing first on structural and 
specification tests (i.e., how well the models explain the data conditioned on known 
parameters) and next on parameter sensitivity and prediction properties (i.e., rela-
tive model performance conditioned on estimated parameters).
structural Approach.—The next three results address three different models that 
ultimately become combined into the  Newton-Jaws model. Each has its own struc-
ture that can be tested separately. Result 4 addresses the market jaws model. Result 5 
examines the Newton model and Result 6 examines the Walrasian model.
Result 4: The two main properties of the market jaws find limited support in the 
data: 
 (i) (Slope revelation). The excess demand slopes based on true parameters of 
the model are well approximated by the slope estimates obtained from the 
jaws. 
Figure 5. Average Efficiency Score by Period (average across periods: 82.6 percent, converges to 89.1 percent)
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 (ii) (Excess demand revelation). The  jaws-based estimates of the excess demand 
converge to near the actual excess demand, especially at call 2. At call 1, 
substantial variance precludes tight convergence.
Support: Consider (i), slope revelation. The slopes of the jaws imperfectly but 
robustly reflect the true slopes of aggregate demand and supply at each call. The 
null hypothesis says both estimated jaw slopes closely approximate the slopes 
of the true demand and supply at price  p 1 , or equivalently, in terms of Figure 2, 
 α ≈  α ∗ and  β ≈  β ∗ . To test that this holds for demand and supply remaining after 
the first call, we use the algorithm that has a resemblance to the  two-stage least 
squares, and essentially compares  s ′ (  p 1 ) with  cot α (or  D ′ (  p 1 ) with  − cot β , respec-
tively). The null hypothesis says that the jaws perfectly reveal each slope (e.g., that 
in regression  s ′ (  p 1 )  =  γ 1 cot α + ε ,  γ 1 = 1 ). The detailed description is provided 
in Appendix Section A1. We report the more conservative estimates (with fixed  τ , 
the number of orders used to estimate the slopes from the data) in Table 5, and addi-
tional estimates in Table A1 in Appendix A.
After the first call, the slope of the revealed supply can be positively related to 
the slope of the equilibrium supply, but the null of full supply revelation is rejected 
at  < 0.001 significance level. By contrast, the true demand revelation at call 1 is 
only marginally rejected. We also checked revelation after the second call. The null 
hypothesis of perfect revelation by jaws for demand is not rejected.
Overall, our results in Table 5 show that the slopes of the jaws can imperfectly but 
meaningfully approximate the slope of the excess demand even with substantially 
infrequent trade opportunities, as in a call market.
Consider (ii), excess demand revelation. The second hypothesized property of 
jaw adjustment is that the arrivals of bids relative to asks shortly before a call is 
Table 4—Summary Data Statistics across Periods
Variable Before shift After shift
Mean Range Mean Range
Total period volume, units 21.38 [13.00 .. 32.00] 20.43 [13.00 .. 29.00]
Equilibrium period volume, units 23.93 [17.00 .. 32.00] 23.00 [18.00 .. 32.00]
Average period price, francs 174.50 [121.50 .. 225.00] 248.30 [191.50 .. 288.50]
Equilibrium period price, francs 179.60 [165.00 .. 201.00] 256.70 [240.00 .. 280.50]
Efficiency, percent 79.81 [28.28 .. 99.54] 85.32 [61.80 .. 99.21]
Table 5—Estimation of Supply/Demand Slope Revelation at Each Call by Market Jaws
Supply at call 1 Demand at call 1 Supply at call 2 Demand at call 2
Regressor Estimate (SE) Estimate (SE) Estimate (SE) Estimate (SE)
Slope( γ 1 )  0.693  (0.065)  1.518  (0.203)  0.661 (0.045)  1.005 (0.104)
 H 0 :  γ 1 = 1 Rejected at  < 0.001 level
Rejected at  
< 0.05 level
Rejected at  
< 0.001 level
Not rejected
Notes: Bootstrap-corrected estimates of regression (A1) terms (for jaws computed using fixed  τ ) and their standard 
errors using 10,000 replications. The null of perfect revelation by jaws,  H 0 :  γ 1 = 1 , is bootstrap-tested. 
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 proportional to excess demand at the call price. The intuition is that an approaching 
call motivates the traders to actively submit and adjust their bids and asks, with 
adjustment rate depending on excess demand at the current price.
We test this hypothesis by estimating a model of convergence of the excess 
demand estimated using  bid-ask relative difference23 to the actual excess demand 
at the call price.
We use the difference between ( bid-ask based) excess demand and the actual 
excess demand at the call as a dependent variable in regression (5) that was pre-
viously used to estimate convergence to equilibrium price and volume. The result-
ing table is similar to Table 3 (see Table A2 in Appendix A.) The null of perfect 
convergence is rejected at call 1, since the estimate of the asymptote coefficient in 
regression (5) applied to the difference between the  bid-ask arrival excess demand 
and the actual excess demand at call 1 is 7.620, significantly different from zero. 
However, we cannot reject convergence at call 2: the asymptote of 3.904 is insignif-
icant. Figure 6 illustrates that revelation of excess demand via  bid-ask arrival differ-
ences improves over time approaching the actual excess demand, while substantial 
variance in estimated excess demand at call 1 precludes tight convergence.24
Result 5: The price movement toward the equilibrium can be described by the 
Newton method of solving systems of equations. However, Newton does not capture 
well the price change across the calls. The relation is significant and  particularly 
strong for predicting the equilibrium price given the actual induced parameters, 
excess demand and excess demand slope evaluated at the call price.
Support: The theory behind this result is described in subsection IIIC. There are 
several ways to estimate Newton (3). The simplest one is to use the actual excess 
23 To obtain this, we added up the  bid-ask arrival differences over the last 30 seconds before each call. We chose 
this time interval to capture the most intense period of trading activity shortly before a call. 
24 Spearman rank correlation between excess demand and  bid-ask arrival differences is 0.141 at call 1, and 
0.139 at call 2. 
Figure 6. Average Difference between Excess Demand as Revealed by Jaws and the Actual Excess 
Demand after Each Call
Note: In period 9, there is a parameter shift.
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demand and slope as dictated by parameters and the independent variables and 
directly estimate a linear relation
(7)  p t+1 −  p t =  δ 1  ED(  p t ) ______E D ′ (  p t ) + ε ,
where  t = 1, 2 is the call number,  ED(  p t ) is excess demand at price  p t ,  E D ′ (  p t ) is 
the slope of excess demand at  p t , and  ε is the random error, and then test if  δ 1 = − 1 . 
Alternatively, one can add the intercept
(8)  p t+1 −  p t =  δ 0 +  δ 1  ED(  p t ) ______E D ′ (  p t ) + ε ,
and test the joint hypothesis  H 0 :  δ 0 = 0,  δ 1 = − 1 .
There are also at least three choices for the time difference in (7) and (8). For 
t = 1 , we have a choice between setting  p t+1 equal to the price at the second call 
and the equilibrium price. For  t = 2 , we set  p t+1 equal to the equilibrium price in 
the current period, since books are cleared each period.
Table 6 presents the main estimation results for the Newton regression (7) using 
the actual excess demand and its slope.
The main insight from Table 6 is that there is a significant relation between the 
Newton term and the price dynamics. More specifically, when regression (7) is esti-
mated for the difference between the equilibrium price and the price at either call, 
the null hypothesis of perfect Newton dynamics is not rejected. When we estimate 
(7) for the difference between the call prices, the null of perfect Newton is rejected, 
indicating that the price change across calls is too large to approximate the instanta-
neous rate of change sufficiently well as required by Newton.
Thus, there is strong evidence for a Newton structure. The price movement is 
to the equilibrium but not to the next call price (unless it is near the equilibrium), 
which emphasizes that the Newton method is a theory of equilibration, not a theory 
of price movement independent of its equilibration tendencies. In particular, the 
price change across calls in a period seems to incorporate factors in addition to the 
Newton term, like, e.g., strategic considerations.
Table 6—Estimation of Newton at Each Call Using Actual Excess Demand and Its Slope
Call 1 Call 2
Regressor Dep. var.:  p ∗ −  p 1 Dep. var.:  p 2 −  p 1 Dep. var.:  p ∗ −  p 2 
Newton part ( δ 1 )   − 0.991   − 0.441   − 1.070 (0.090) (0.039) (0.049)
Observations 108 108 108
 RMSE 6.142 5.904 3.171
Newton hypothesis Not rejected Rejected at  
< 0.001 level
Not rejected
Notes: Bootstrap-corrected estimates of regression (7) terms (using 10,000 replications) with their standard errors 
in parentheses. The hypothesis  H 0 :  δ 1 = − 1 is bootstrap-tested.
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Result 6: Walrasian model based on excess demand given by parameters 
at the call price also explains price change in a period but less accurately than 
Newton.
Support:  The simplest way to estimate Walrasian adjustment (4) is to directly 
estimate a linear relation using the theoretical excess demand as dictated by param-
eters as the independent variable,
(9)  p t+1 −  p t =  γ 1 ED(  p t )  + ε ,
and then test  H 0 :  γ 1 ≥ 0 versus  one-sided alternative  γ 1 < 0 .
Thus, the fundamental difference from Newton adjustment is that (9) does not 
utilize the excess demand slope.
Table 7 shows the results of the model estimation.
While we observe a significant and positive coefficient on the excess demand,  γ 1 , as 
predicted by Walras, the overall regression fit, as measured by the  root-mean-square 
error (RMSE), is worse than that produced by Newton (7) in Table 6 in two out of 
three cases, estimated from the same data (RMSE is larger). The exception is the 
estimate of call 1 price in which the RMSE is 5.162 for Walras and 6.142 for the 
Newton model. Thus, Newton seems to outperform Walras adjustment by utilizing 
the information about the slopes of excess demand in price adjustment between calls 
and after the second call.
Parameter information sensitivity and Relative Model Performance.—When the 
structure of the Newton method of solving systems of equations is supplemented 
by the behavioral features of Jaws a new,  Newton-Jaws, model takes shape. The 
 Newton-Jaws model merges two variables known to be associated with price dis-
covery, excess demand and order flow. Results 4 and 5 together with the models 
from subsections IIIB and IIIC demonstrated that these variables both can stand 
alone and provide the ingredients for useful models of market movement. Each 
provides its own view of market adjustment. However, a more powerful model 
emerges when the two types of variables become integrated into the  Newton-Jaws 
Table 7—Estimation of Walras at Each Call Using Actual Excess Demand and Its Slope
Call 1 Call 2
Regressor Dep. var.:  p ∗ −  p 1 Dep. var.:  p 2 −  p 1 Dep. var.:  p ∗ −  p 2 
Walras part ( γ 1 )   1.474   0.558   1.562 (0.085) (0.106) (0.067)
Observations 108 108 108
 RMSE 5.162 7.205 3.550
Walras hypothesis Not rejected Not rejected Not rejected
Notes: Bootstrap-corrected estimates of regression (9) terms (using 10,000 replications) with their standard errors 
in parentheses. The null hypothesis  H 0 :  γ 1 ≥ 0 versus alternative  H a :  γ 1 < 0 is bootstrap-tested.
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model. Result 4 and Result 5, together with (7) outline a precise way this can 
be done.25
This seems particularly relevant for settings where the underlying supply and 
demand parameters are not observed by the econometrician, e.g., in the field. In 
the analysis that follows, we investigate the relative performance of  Newton-Jaws 
and its sensitivity to the information about parameters. The model makes very pre-
cise predictions about the price change, and so should be easy to reject in the data. 
Nevertheless, Result 7 demonstrates that  Newton-Jaws is on par with less precise 
adjustment models, like Walras and excess bids, that only make predictions about 
the sign of the price change.
Result 7: For predicting price change in a period, the  Newton-Jaws model fit 
is similar to that of Walrasian and excess bids, and better in all three of our price 
change comparisons when estimated conditioned on known excess demand and 
 jaws-estimated excess demand slope.
Support: The excess bids model is examined through the application of the same 
methodology as used to test the  Newton-Jaws model and the Walrasian excess 
demand model. Let  XB(  p t ) be the total number of buy orders (bids) minus the total 
number of sell orders (asks) existing in the market at time  t . With  t being the end of 
second call, we should note that the excess bid measure includes all bids and asks at 
the call, including those unfilled orders that remained from the first call.
We estimate
(10)  p t+1 −  p t =  β 1 XB(  p t )  + ε .
Table 8 shows the results of the model estimation.
The results in Table 8 demonstrate that the model of price dynamics based on 
the number of buy orders (bids) minus the number of sell orders (asks) cannot be 
rejected.
Both Walras and Newton show a better overall fit than excess bids when evaluated 
using the true parameters, as indicated by uniformly lower RMSE in Tables 6 and 
7 compared to Table 8. Since excess bids do not rely on experiment parameters, it 
is important to check whether the better fit of Walras and Newton continues to hold 
when the true parameters are unknown, as in the field. Therefore, we also compared 
the fit when these models are evaluated conditioned on estimated measures of excess 
demand and its slope, so that all three models are on an equal footing. This compar-
ison is reported below (see Tables A3 and A5 in Appendix A for additional details).
25 Namely, Result 5 shows support for the Newton method of price adjustment across calls when the right-hand 
side of equation (7) is evaluated conditioned on known experimental parameters. Jaws provides a way to recover 
the Newton part in (7) directly from the data, as we established in Result 4, and allow us to estimate these quantities 
in various combinations. First, we can take both slopes and excess demand estimated from the jaws. Second, we 
can take the  jaws-estimated slopes and use the true excess demand. Third, we can take the true slopes and use the 
 jaws-estimated excess demand. Finally, for  jaws-based slope estimates, we can use either the fixed revealed jaws, 
or the  best-fitted revealed jaws. All of these cases are reported in Tables A3 and A4 in Appendix A, which include 
Table 6 as a special case. 
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From Table 9, we determine that the  Newton-Jaws model is more accurate than 
either Walras or excess bids when jaws are used to estimate excess demand slopes 
(Newton RMSE of 11.877, 7.920, and 8.044 versus excess bids RMSE of 19.638, 
10.042, and 13.954, respectively, and Walras RMSE of 21.121, 10.468, and 14.288, 
respectively), and similar but slightly less accurate when jaws are used to estimate 
excess demand. In the latter case,  Newton-Jaws is a bit more accurate than Walras 
(Newton RMSE is lower except at call 2.) Newton is slightly worse than excess bids 
when both excess demand and its slope are  jaws-estimated, and slightly better than 
Walras except at call 2. Thus,  Newton-Jaws fit is similar to both of these alternatives.
In other words, the empirical variant of Newton performs at least as well as alter-
native empirical models. Since at the same time, Newton predictions are much more 
precise than those of the alternatives, Newton overall performance is strictly better.
An explanation of the accuracy differences among the three models when com-
parably evaluated can be provided by adding an assumption about the subjects’ 
bidding strategies. Given the nature of bidding strategies as postulated by Jaws, the 
different measures bring different information content to the model as follows.
Excess demand provides no direct information about the distance of the price from 
the equilibrium price. The excess demand measure as contained in the parameters 
evaluated at a price, contains only the qualitative information in the sign of the excess 
demand, which suggests an upward or downward movement. By contrast, excess 
bids reflect behaviors and contain limited information about excess demand as well 
Table 8—Estimation of Price Dynamics Using Excess Bids
Call 1 Call 2
Regressor Dep. var.:  p ∗ −  p 1 Dep. var.:  p 2 −  p 1 Dep. var.:  p ∗ −  p 2 
Excess bid part ( β 1 )  1.413  0.576  0.612 (0.340) (0.145) (0.247)
Observations 108 108 108
 RMSE 19.368 10.042 13.954
Excess bid hypothesis Not rejected Not rejected Not rejected
Notes: Bootstrap-corrected estimates of regression (10) terms (using 10,000 replications) with their standard errors 
in parentheses. The null hypothesis  H 0 :  β 1 ≥ 0 versus alternative  H a :  β 1 < 0 is bootstrap-tested.
Table 9—Fit of Newton-Jaws, Walras, and Excess Bids Using Empirical Measures of Excess Demand 
(ED) and Its Slope
Call 1 Call 2
Model Dep. var.:  p ∗ −  p 1 Dep. var.:  p 2 −  p 1 Dep. var.:  p ∗ −  p 2 
Excess bids 19.638 10.042 13.954
Walras 21.166 10.529 14.071
Newton-Jaws:
  E  D jaws ,  ED  slope jaws 20.670 10.493 14.147
  E  D jaws , true  ED slope 21.121 10.468 14.288
 true  ED ,  ED  slope jaws 11.878  7.920  8.044
Notes: For each model in the first column, RMSE fit is reported in the corresponding cell. Subscript “jaws” indicates 
the quantity estimated from jaws as opposed to true parameters.
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as some information about the distance from the equilibrium price. However, the bids 
and asks order flow can also reflect unrealistic expectations, attempted signals, and 
other complex phenomena, so the quality of the information when aggregated can be 
poor. Under an assumption about the nature of tenders, the excess bids can contain 
information about the sign of the excess demand as well as limited information about 
the excess demand slope: if traders tend to restrict bids and asks to those for which 
values reside within a common, fixed interval of the price, then as predicted by the 
Jaws model, the total number of bids or asks placed will increase with the inverse of 
the respective slopes. Thus, according to the model, the relative numbers of bids over 
asks contain more information about limit values than just excess demand.
The difference of information about limit values differentiates the information 
content supplied to a model by the two variables, excess bids and excess demand, 
and their integration by the  Newton-Jaws. The information in excess bids is indirect 
since it depends on the consistency with which bidders submit bids and asks given 
their incentives and the excess bids model does not have the information needed to 
produce a calculation. By contrast, in the  Newton-Jaws, the information about limit 
values exists directly and separately to be used by the model. Thus, the key infor-
mation about both excess demand and slopes of the demand and supply is contained 
in the  Newton-Jaws model.26 Given the microstructure of the price determination in 
the call markets the information is sufficient to provide a prediction of both direction 
and magnitude of price movement toward the competitive equilibrium.
VI. Conclusion
This paper initiates an investigation of principles of price adjustment in experi-
mental  multiple-call,  multiple-unit markets. As such, it extends other research chal-
lenged by the possibility that call markets might provide a tool that helps solve 
problems encountered in markets operating in field environments. The challenge is 
made complex by wide ranging institutional features that can be assembled in many 
different configurations to create alternative call market architectures. The strategy 
is to experimentally probe theories of how selected institutions work together.
We report evidence that multiple calls, the shape of the associated order book, 
and a natural  profit-maximizing behavior of individual traders organize themselves 
to produce an underlying price discovery process similar to one iterative step of a 
powerful tool for finding solutions to systems of equations (the  Newton-Raphson 
method).
More specifically, we ask two main general questions:
•	 Do	call	market	exchanges	converge	to	the	classical	demand	and	supply?
•	 Do	major	patterns	of	convergence	follow	those	suggested	by	market	jaws	and	
Newton?
26 Table 9 shows how the goodness of fit of the Newton regression (7) changes as actual parameter values are 
replaced with their  data-driven estimates. See also Table A3 in Appendix A. 
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We provide positive answers to both questions. Market behavior is captured by the 
competitive equilibrium model. The shape of the order book, captured by market 
jaws, reveals useful information about the slope of excess demand, which becomes 
part of the price change dynamics across calls. The change in the price toward 
equilibrium follows a single iteration of the Newton method for solving equa-
tions remarkably closely and produces a  Newton-Jaws model. While the Walrasian 
adjustment, which does not include slopes of excess demand, finds support in the 
data, structural tests of the two models demonstrate that the  Newton-Jaws model 
provides a better description of how the markets operate. At the same time, we 
conduct  nonstructural tests of the models like those that might be possible in field 
applications, and find that the performance of both models is similar. Interestingly 
the performance of the two models in that testing environment is also similar to the 
excess bids model that has price changes predicted by the difference between the 
total number of bids and asks. However, close examination of the excess bids model 
suggests that the reason for its predictive power resides in its close proximity to 
excess demand and the market jaws.
Our results reveal a systemic compatibility between the  self-organizing and coor-
dinating features that emerge from individual behavior and the institutional features 
that guide it. The combination shows that a price discovery process can be related to 
the Newton method based on the order flow approximated by the market jaws. The 
question suggested is whether or not other market features can be combined with 
even more powerful tools to produce better market performance. Are there meth-
ods better than Newton when put to this purpose? What institutional modifications 
might be needed to establish compatibility?
Appendix A. Additional Estimation Details
This Appendix supplies additional estimation details for the results in Section V.
A1. Algorithm for Testing slope Revelation by Market Jaws
For brevity, the description here focuses on supply only. Stages I and II address 
measurement challenges created by the discrete nature of the data. Stage III tests 
whether the estimated slopes reveal the true ones.
Stage I: For each data point  i ∈ {1, … , N } corresponding to the first call in a 
period (subindex  i is suppressed below):
 (i) Estimate the slope of the revealed supply at  p 1 ,  s ̂1 , by best fitting  τ + 1 
remaining (i.e., unfilled) asks in the book with a line that goes through the 
actual  price-quantity point at the first call,  (  p 1 ,  q 1 ) . That is, estimate a regres-
sion of the form
  u k −  q 1 =  θ ˆ(  a k −  p 1 ) ,
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  where  a k >  p 1 is the  k th remaining ask in the book,  k ∈ {0, … , τ} ,  u k is 
the corresponding  k th unit, and  θ ˆ = cot α ̂ is the estimate of the slope of  s ̂1 . 
Keep  θ ˆ.
 (ii) Estimate the slope of the true supply at  p 1 ,  s(  p 1 ) , by best fitting  2 τ ′ private 
costs around the true supply curve at  p 1 (i.e., those  c k ∈ [  p 1 − Δ,  p 1 + Δ] 
for some  Δ > 0 and each  k ∈ {− τ ′ , … , 0, … ,  τ ′ } ) with a line that goes 
through supply at the actual price at the first call,  (  p 1 , s(  p 1 )) . That is, esti-
mate a regression of the form
  u k − s(  p 1 )  =  θ ˆ∗ (  c k −  p 1 ) ,
  where  c k is the  k th component in the vector  ( c − τ ′  , … ,  c 0 , … ,  c  τ ′  ) of costs for 
a fixed  τ ′ around the true supply27 at  p 1 , with  c − τ ′  ≤ ⋯ ≤  c 0 ≤ ⋯ ≤  c  τ ′  ;  u k 
is the corresponding  k th unit around  s(  p 1 ) , and  θ 1ˆ ∗ = cot  α ̂ ∗ is the estimate 
of the slope of  s (  p 1 ) . Keep  θ ˆ∗ .
 (iii) Record the pair  (cot  α ̂ i ∗ , cot  α ̂ i ) as one observation in the new dataset.
Stage II: Using the data constructed at stage I, estimate
(A1)  cot  α ̂ i =  γ 1 cot  α ̂ i ∗ +  ε i ,
where  ε i is the random error. We bootstrapped the regression in (A1) using 10,000 
replications.
Stage III: Test the null hypothesis  H 0 :  γ 1 = 1 versus the  two-sided alternative. 
If the null is not rejected, then the slope of the remaining supply after the first call 
perfectly reveals the true supply slope. Alternatively, we can add an intercept  γ 0 in (A1) and test the joint null  H 0 :  γ 0 = 0,  γ 1 = 1 .28 If the null is rejected but  γ 1 is 
positive and significant, the slope is revealed imperfectly, still providing some useful 
information about the underlying market parameters.
The coherence of true supply and revealed supply slopes after the second call, as 
well as coherence of true demand and revealed demand after each call, can be esti-
mated and tested in the same way.
The procedure above is silent about how  τ and  τ ′ are specified. For  τ ′ this is not 
an issue, since the equilibrium demand/supply at any price is recovered from our 
parameters, and is close to a linear curve in all of our experimental sessions. To have 
a sufficiently smooth approximation, we chose  τ ′ = 7 , thus, estimating the equi-
librium slopes on  14 points around the point where the equilibrium curve intersects 
with the actual price.
27 For example, if we take three true costs below  p 1 and three true costs above  p 1 , then  τ ′ = 3 . 
28 We checked both specifications and found minimal differences. 
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To determine  τ , we used two approaches. In the first one, we exogenously fixed 
τ at three-fourths of excluded orders for each data point  i ∈ {1, … , N } . This helps 
exclude the extreme orders that may have large impact on linear estimates. In the 
second one, we repeated steps  (i)  − (ii) of stage I, varying  τ from  3 units29 up to the 
length of the book (in units) at the call in question, and then picked the value that 
produced the best match (in terms of minimizing the absolute difference) between 
the slopes of equilibrium demand/supply and the slopes of the actual data at that 
price, estimated using  τ units of remaining demand/supply. Thus, in this case, we 
 best-fitted the slopes for individual data points of the regression at stage II. Note 
that this does not automatically imply that regression (A1) is trivial, since different 
data points may require different values of  τ . This approach nests the estimation 
technique from Asparouhova, Bossaerts, and Plott (2003), who find limited support 
for the jaws (in the form of correlation between the order book and excess demand) 
using a small and exogenously set  τ .
29 We chose three as the minimal number of units that allows a  non-singular OLS fit. 
Table A1—Estimation of Supply/Demand Slope Revelation at Each Call by Market Jaws
 s(  p 1 )  s(  p 2 ) 
Variable  τ = best-fit  τ = fixed  τ = best-fit  τ = fixed 
 γ 1  0.762  0.693  0.823  0.661 (0.043) (0.065) (0.030) (0.045)
 R adj 2 0.786 0.574 0.891 0.710
 H 0 Rejected at  < 0.001 level
Rejected at  
< 0.001 level
Rejected at  
< 0.001 level
Rejected at  
< 0.001 level
Observations 101 101 101 101
 D(  p 1 )  D(  p 2 ) 
Variable   τ = best-fit   τ = fixed   τ = best-fit   τ = fixed 
 γ 1  0.966  1.518  1.024  1.005 (0.052) (0.203) (0.043) (0.104)
 R adj 2 0.751 0.326 0.809 0.468
 H 0 Not rejected Rejected at  < 0.05 level
Not rejected Not rejected
Observations 101 101 101 101
Notes: Bootstrap-corrected estimates of regression (A1) main terms and their standard errors are in parentheses, 
using 10,000 replications. The null hypothesis  H 0 :  γ 1 = 1 is bootstrap-tested.
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Table A3—Estimation of Newton (7) at Each Call
Regressor  s ,  ED  s ,  E  D j  s  j fx ,  ED  s j bf ,  ED  s  j fx ,  E  D j  s j bf ,  E  D j 
call 1, dependent variable  p ∗ −  p 1 
 δ 1   − 0.991   − 0.520   − 0.784   − 0.026   − 0.140   − 0.231 (0.090) (0.157) (0.096) (0.244) (0.079) (0.056)
 R adj 2 0.922 0.073 0.707 0.343 0.008 0.112
 RMSE 6.142 21.121 11.878 17.780 21.850 20.670
 H 0 Not rejected Rejected at  < 0.01 level
Rejected at  
< 0.05 level
Rejected at  
< 0.001 level
Rejected at  
< 0.001 level
Rejected at  
< 0.001 level
call 1, dependent variable  p 2 −  p 1 
 δ 1   − 0.441   − 0.257   − 0.316   − 0.008   − 0.084   − 0.090 (0.039) (0.090) (0.065) (0.105) (0.041) (0.030)
 R adj 2 0.706 0.075 0.470 0.222 0.016 0.070
 RMSE 5.904 10.468 7.920 9.599 10.791 10.493
 H 0 Rejected at  < 0.001 level 
Rejected at  
< 0.001 level 
Rejected at  
< 0.001 level 
Rejected at  
< 0.001 level 
Rejected at  
< 0.001 level 
Rejected at  
< 0.001 level 
call 2, dependent variable  p ∗ −  p 2 
 δ 1   − 1.070   − 0.743   − 0.630   − 0.874   − 0.377   − 0.763 (0.049) (0.319) (0.105) (0.054) (0.224) (0.308)
 R adj 2 0.955 0.079 0.708 0.909 0.029 0.097
 RMSE 3.171 14.288 8.044 4.488 14.668 14.147
 H 0 Not rejected Not rejected Rejected at  < 0.01 level
Rejected at  
< 0.05 level 
Rejected at  
< 0.01 level 
Not rejected
Observations 108 108 108 108 108 108
Notes: Bootstrap-corrected estimates of regression (7) terms with their standard errors using 10,000 replications 
are in parentheses. Notation:  s is true slope,  ED is true excess demand,  j subscript stands for jaws-based,  fx is using 
fixed book share for estimating jaws, and  bf is using best-fitted jaws. The null of perfect Newton,  H 0 :  δ 1 = − 1 , 
is bootstrap-tested.
Table A2—Estimation of Excess Demand Revelation by Jaws: Convergence of Bid-Ask Arrival 
Difference to the True Excess Demand at Each Call
Regressor Dependent variable: Excess demand difference
Call 1 Call 2
Asymptote ( γ ) 7.555  (2.086)  3.883  (1.492) 
Origin (before shift) in
session 1 ( β 1 )   − 24.013   (21.036)   − 10.993   (13.984) 
— 2 ( β 2 )   4.661   (7.066)   3.842   (9.944) 
— 3 ( β 3 )   − 36.091   (23.792)   − 14.199   (6.332) 
— 4 ( β 4 )   − 21.816   (10.822)   − 1.666   (7.335) 
— 5 ( β 5 )   − 48.882   (10.664)   − 37.351   (8.960) 
— 6 ( β 6 )   − 59.861   (26.377)   − 29.484   (18.563) 
— 7 ( β 7 )   − 2.616   (10.467)   5.470   (11.578) 
Origin (after shift) in
session 1 ( δ 1 )   − 35.522   (16.313)   − 4.510   (7.214) 
— 2 ( δ 2 )   − 40.565   (9.519)   − 25.600   (4.650) 
— 3 ( δ 3 ) 11.767   (17.212)  − 6.184   (3.268) 
— 4 ( δ 4 )   − 2.134   (8.397)  − 6.213   (7.223) 
— 5 ( δ 5 )   − 16.124   (13.886)   − 12.023   (8.145) 
— 6 ( δ 6 )   − 52.884   (14.898)   − 28.367   (8.096) 
— 7 ( δ 7 )   − 25.708   (9.739)   − 12.985   (6.329) 
Observations  94  94 
 R adj 2  0.614  0.547 
 F -stat  12.570  9.774 
Notes: Bootstrap standard errors are in parentheses. Estimates are bootstrap-corrected for bias. 
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Appendix B. Robustness Check:  
Newton Applied to  Zero-Intelligence Robots
In order to check the robustness of our main result, the  Newton-like price dynam-
ics across calls, we also simulated artificial data using  zero-intelligence robots (see, 
e.g., Gode and Sunder 1993, Cason 1992). From the analysis of  zero-intelligence 
Table A4—Estimation of Newton (8) at Each Call
Regressor  s ,  ED  s ,  E  D j  s  j fx ,  ED  s j bf ,  ED  s  j fx ,  E  D j  s j bf ,  E  D j 
call 1, dependent variable  p ∗ −  p 1 
 δ 0  0.738  7.857  2.210  7.897  8.829  8.018 (0.495) (1.858) (0.796) (2.831) (1.914) (1.860)
 δ 1  − 0.976  − 0.316  − 0.784  0.000  − 0.096  − 0.200 (0.095) (0.139) (0.093) (0.246) (0.064) (0.043)
 R adj 2 0.907 0.024 0.657 0.298 0.000 0.088
 H 0 Not rejected Rejected at  < 0.001 level
Rejected at  
< 0.05 level
Rejected at  
< 0.001 level
Rejected at  
< 0.001 level
Rejected at  
< 0.001 level
call 1, dependent variable  p 2 −  p 1 
 δ 0  1.027  3.955  1.966  4.155  4.406  4.164 (0.621) (0.836) (0.582) (1.251) (0.932) (0.916)
 δ 1  − 0.422  − 0.155  − 0.284  0.002  − 0.062  − 0.073 (0.044) (0.080) (0.064) (0.100) (0.036) (0.025)
 R adj 2 0.652 0.024 0.390 0.172 0.006 0.047
 H 0 Rejected at  < 0.001 level
Rejected at  
< 0.001 level
Rejected at  
< 0.001 level
Rejected at  
< 0.001 level
Rejected at  
< 0.001 level
Rejected at  
< 0.001 level
call 2, dependent variable  p ∗ −  p 2 
 δ 0  0.113  3.632  1.411  0.148  4.098  3.491 (0.220) (1.341) (0.609) (0.383) (1.340) (1.351)
 δ 1  − 1.068  − 0.579  − 0.612  − 0.872  − 0.265  − 0.619 (0.049) (0.310) (0.105) (0.055) (0.210) (0.310)
 R adj 2 0.950 0.046 0.688 0.900 0.011 0.062
 H 0 Not rejected Not rejected Rejected at  < 0.01 level
Rejected at  
< 0.05 level
Rejected at  
< 0.001 level
Not rejected
Notes: Bootstrap-corrected estimates of regression (8) terms with their standard errors using 10,000 replications 
are in parentheses. Notation:  s is true slope,  ED is true excess demand,  j subscript stands for jaws-based,  fx is 
using fixed book share for estimating jaws, and  bf is using best-fitted jaws. The joint hypothesis of perfect Newton, 
H 0 :  δ 0 = 0, δ 1 = − 1 , is bootstrap-tested.
Table A5—Estimation of Price Dynamics Using Excess Bids from the Last 30 Seconds Before Call
Call 1 Call 2
Regressor Dep. var.:  p ∗ −  p 1 Dep. var.:  p 2 −  p 1 Dep. var.:  p ∗ −  p 2 
Excess bid part (  β 1 )  0.864  0.410  1.471 (0.279) (0.132) (0.580)
Observations 108 108 108
 RMSE 21.166 10.529 14.071
Excess bid hypothesis Not rejected Not rejected Not rejected
Notes: Bootstrap-corrected estimates of regression (10) terms are based on the bids and asks in the last 30 sec-
onds before a call (using 10,000 replications) with their standard errors in parentheses. The null hypothesis 
 H 0 :  β 1 ≥ 0 versus alternative  H a :  β 1 < 0 is bootstrap-tested. 
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trades, described below, we conclude that Newton is a property of institution rather 
than an outcome of strategic interaction, and is directly related to convergence 
towards the competitive equilibrium.
The simulations were done as follows. We ran  512 replications of each of  pre-shift 
and  post-shift experimental setting. In each replication period, there are  2 calls, 
and  zero-intelligence buyers and sellers make random bids and asks as follows. 
Buyer bids for each unit are uniform from  [110,  unit value] . Seller asks for each 
unit are uniform from  [unit cost, 250] . The unit values and costs are exactly as used 
in Sessions  5–7 of the experiment (see Table 2). Each of  15 buyers (three buyers for 
each of  5 buyer types) submits independent bids for all  6 units. Each of  15 sellers 
(three sellers for each of  5 seller types) submits independent asks for all  6 units.30 
At the first call, price and trade volume are determined based on the orders in the 
book as in the experiment. Then buyers and sellers make random bids and asks for 
the remaining units. At the second call, price and trade volume are determined based 
on the orders in the book, and the replication period ends.
Since bidding is completely random, only the price dynamics across calls are 
studied. The randomness also precludes the use of the difference between the num-
ber of bids and asks as a measure of revealed excess demand. Table B1 contains 
the main results based on the actual excess demand and its slope. Results using 
 jaws-based slope estimates are reported in Table B2.
Table B1 demonstrates Newton predictions are robust even when applied to agent 
bids produced by zero intelligence. In all of the estimations the coefficient at the 
Newton term in (8),  δ 1 , has correct negative sign. At the same time, we reject the 
null hypothesis of full consistency with Newton: the constant term  δ 0 is significantly 
different from zero. This seems to be due to the fact that tight convergence to com-
petitive equilibrium (a necessary assumption for Newton adjustment to work) is 
lacking under random bidding. Nevertheless, note that price at the first call points 
toward equilibrium price from below ( δ 0 > 0 ), while price at the second call over-
shoots and points toward equilibrium from above ( δ 0 < 0 ). Importantly, the price 
movement indication (the Newton part) is toward equilibrium price in both cases.
30 An equivalent representation is to assume that each buyer or seller only has  1 unit, and there are  90 buyers 
and  90 sellers. 
Table B1—Estimation of Newton at Each Call, Zero-Intelligence Data
Call 1 Call 2
Regressor Dep. var.:  p ∗ −  p 1 Dep. var.:  p 2 −  p 1 Dep. var.:  p ∗ −  p 2 
Intercept (  δ 0 )  0.245  6.979  − 1.045 (0.114) (0.288) (0.131)
Newton part (  δ 1 )  − 1.068  − 1.154  − 0.889 (0.016) (0.044) (0.012)
 H 0 :  δ 0 = 0,  δ 1 = − 1   Rejected at   0.001 level
 Rejected at  
< 0.001 level
 Rejected at  
< 0.001 level
Notes: Table lists OLS estimates of regression (8) terms for ZI data ( N = 1,024 ), shift fixed effects included, with 
standard errors in parentheses. The joint hypothesis  H 0 :  δ 0 = 0,  δ 1 = − 1 is tested. 
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Appendix C: Instructions  Emailed to the Participants
C1. Experiment overview
There are two types of participants on the public market (labeled ‘Market  X ’): 
public buyers and public sellers. The public buyers place orders to buy and public 
sellers place orders to sell in the public  X market. Public buyers have odd IDs and 
public sellers have even IDs.
The experiment uses a currency called “francs.” The exchange rate between 
francs and real money that you get paid is fixed and will be announced at the start 
of the experiment.
The experiment consists of several six-minute periods. Periods are independent 
from each other, and your payment is based on your total earnings in all periods. 
This means that you should try making profit in each period, but if you make a 
mistake and lose in some periods, you’ll have a chance to recover in future periods.
Before the actual experiment begins, there will be three  low-paid practice rounds. 
If you are consistently losing money during the practice rounds, you will be declared 
bankrupt and the system will block you from further participation.
You have been guaranteed a minimum, but you will receive it only if you partici-
pate for the full duration of the experiment.
Table B2—Estimation of Newton at Each Call, ZI Data
Regressor  s ,  ED  s  j fx ,  ED  s j bf ,  ED 
call 1, dependent variable  p ∗ −  p 1 
 δ 0  0.245  0.185  0.197 (0.114) (0.118) (0.118)
 δ 1  − 1.068  − 2.210  − 1.211 (0.016) (0.042) (0.027)
 H 0 Rejected at < 0.001 level Rejected at < 0.001 level Rejected at < 0.001 level
call 1, dependent variable  p 2 −  p 1 
 δ 0  6.979  6.915  6.928 (0.288) (0.288) (0.288)
 δ 1  − 1.154  − 2.392  − 1.312 (0.044) (0.094) (0.054)
 H 0 Rejected at < 0.001 level Rejected at < 0.001 level Rejected at < 0.001 level
call 2, dependent variable  p ∗ −  p 2 
 δ 0  − 1.045  − 1.642  − 1.168 (0.131) (0.129) (0.132)
 δ 1  − 0.889  − 1.213  − 0.885 (0.012) (0.016) (0.012)
 H 0 Rejected at < 0.001 level Rejected at < 0.001 level Rejected at < 0.001 level 
Notes: Table lists OLS estimates of regression (8) terms for ZI data ( N = 1,024 ), shift fixed effects included, with 
standard errors in parentheses. Notation:  s is true slope,  ED is true excess demand,  j subscript stands for jaws-based, 
fx is using fixed book share for estimating jaws, and  bf is using best-fitted jaws. The joint hypothesis  H 0 :  δ 0 = 0, δ 1 = − 1 is tested. 
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C2. Prices and calls
All prices are determined at (and only at) the time of market calls. In each period, 
there are two market calls. One is at  1.5 minutes after a period begins and one is at 
4.5 minutes. During the period, the order book of the public  X market accumulates 
buy and sell orders from public buyers and public sellers, but trade in the public  X 
market can only happen at a market call. If you trade, it will happen at the market 
price, not the price that you state in your orders.
At each call, all buy and sell orders in the order book are simultaneously consid-
ered and a market price is established. It is determined as follows:
•	 Based	on	all	orders	in	the	book,	the	system	sorts	buy	orders	by	their	respective	
prices per unit from high to low. Sell orders are sorted by their respective prices 
per unit from low to high.
•	 The	system	matches	the	two	sorted	series	selecting	all	pairs	for	which	the	pur-
chase price is greater than the sale price, and stops at the last pair for which this 
is true.
•	 The	market	price	is	calculated	midway	between	the	last	accepted	(the lowest 
filled) buy order and the last accepted (highest filled) sell order. Except for ties, 
all buy orders with prices above the market price will trade at the market price. 
All sell orders with prices below the market price will trade at the market price. 
All other orders will remain unfilled.
This means that if your buy order has a price below the market price, it won’t 
trade. Similarly, if your sell order has a price above the market price, it won’t trade. 
However, your order may change the expected market price, if, once inserted in the 
sorted series, it changes the intersection point (the last pair of matched orders where 
the purchase price is greater than the sale price).
Ties happen when there are several orders at the same price per unit in the order 
book and the total quantity demanded at the market price does not match the total 
quantity supplied at that price. In this case, the orders at the market price are filled 
in the first come first served manner as long as there is a match.
If all this sounds too technical, just remember that the market price is based on all 
orders present in the book at the time of the call, and trade only happens at the call.
You can always see the current market price if it exists (based on the orders cur-
rently present in the book) in the Best Buy/Best Sell Offer columns. The number 
before the symbol indicates the total number of units available at the corresponding 
Best Buy/Best Sell price.
The first period will have an additional five minutes before the first call so you 
have time to figure out what to do. The end of the experiment will be announced 
without warning after the last period.
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C3. information for Buyers
If you are a PUBLIC BUYER (an odd ID number): you will buy units in the 
public  X market and collect the values in your Value Opportunities List, just like a 
middleman buying in one and selling in the other.
Profit on unit = Value Opportunity of unit − Price paid for unit in the public  X 
market.
You can lose money if you pay a price in the  X market that is higher than your 
value for the unit, so make sure to look up your Value Opportunities List before you 
buy. You can also miss an opportunity to make money if you do not buy enough 
in the public X market when it is profitable to you. Notice that if you submit a 
 multi-unit order, your profit will likely be different for each consecutive unit, so you 
can lose if the total profit from a  multi-unit order is negative.
You cannot buy more than six units in each call, and if you run out of Values in 
your Value Opportunities List, all units in excess will be redeemed by the system at 
the end of the period at the worst possible price to you.
Values in your Value Opportunities List can change and do expire (each has a 
time tag). Refresh the frame to see an updated time tag (no automatic update). You 
do not need to collect all of the values in your list just because they are there. Some 
can be bad deals, depending on the public  X market so that they can cause you to 
lose money.
At the end of the period your inventory is worthless. That is, if you simply spend 
money and accumulate units of X in your inventory at the end of a period, you will 
lose what you have spent. Neither francs nor inventory will store across periods, 
only your profits.
C4. information for sellers
If you are a PUBLIC SELLER (an even ID number): You will short sell units in the 
public  X market that you afterwards procure at a cost from your Cost Opportunities 
List. You are just like a middleman who short sells in one market, and then, after 
figuring out how much to deliver, buys back in the other market.
Profit on unit = Price received for unit in the  X market − cost of unit from your 
Cost Opportunities List.
Your optimal strategy may seem a bit tricky because it involves short selling. You 
should sell units in the public market before you actually have them. Of course, your 
inventory will go negative until you procure the units needed to cover your sales. 
Once you trade in the public X market, you should procure the units using your Cost 
Opportunities List to cover what you have sold. This strategy allows you to avoid the 
risk from trade, because if you did otherwise, i.e., first paid the cost of the units and 
then tried selling them in the public X market, you would be likely to lose money, 
as the market price might happen to be less than your cost and your units won’t sell.
You can lose money if you sell in the X market at a price that is lower than your 
cost, so make sure to look up your Cost Opportunities List before your sell. You can 
also miss an opportunity to make money if you do not sell enough in the public  X 
market when it is profitable to you. Notice that if you submit a  multi-unit order, your 
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profit will likely be different for each consecutive unit, so you can lose if the total 
profit from a  multi-unit order is negative.
You cannot short sell more than six units in each call, and if you run out of Costs 
in your Cost Opportunities List, all remaining standing units will be covered by the 
system at the end of the period at the worst possible price to you.
Costs in the Cost Opportunities List can change and do expire (each has a time 
tag). Refresh the frame to see an updated time tag (no automatic update). You do not 
need to use all of the costs in your list just because they are there. Some can be bad 
deals, depending on the public X market.
At the end of the period your inventory is worthless. That is, if you accumulate 
debt (i.e., negative inventory) at the end of a period, your cash on hand will be spent 
to cover it, so you will lose what you have earned in that period. Neither francs nor 
inventory will store across periods, only your profits.
C5. Practice and Demo
Instructions for the trading technology and practice are available at URL.
It is in your best interest to understand how this program works.
Do not confuse the experiment and the demo. You cannot participate in the exper-
iment from the demo page.
It is possible that your computer will not be able to load the demo. If your com-
puter can load the demo, then it can load the experiment.
If you have any further questions, please  e-mail us at EMAIL.
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